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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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? 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs James A. Johnson and 
Jennifer L. Johnson, by and through their attorney, Richard C. 
Coxson, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final judgment of 
the Honorable Judge Christofferson. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment, 
-^ay of cA*-*— DATED this < _ , 1993 
RICHARD^C'. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
PO Box 288 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
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Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial as to Nielsen & Senior 
pursuant to Rule 59, U. R. Civ. P., having been submitted to the 
Court for decision and the Court having reviewed the relevant 
documents and papers of the respective parties and having 
rendered a memorandum decision, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, 
pursuant to Rule 59 U. R. Civ. P., be and the same is hereby-
denied. 
21263.NI211.8500 
/ y r DATED this / ^  day of June, 1993. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorab le V^Noy/Chr i ' s^6f fe rsen 
Richard C. CoxUbn, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /£* day of June, 1993, I 
served Defendant's ORDER by causing a true and correct copy of 
the same to be sent, through the United States mails, first-class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Ql IAAA/AA^AP.S^/A 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICjfifc 2frSlfUfHf )j »33 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON, and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, and PAT B. 
BRIAN, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 900400460 CN 
Plaintiffs through th counsel have filed a Motion For New Trial under Rule 
59(b) U.R.C.P. The Motion For N«. Trial is based 01. the representations of the plaintiffs that 
the defendant intentionally misrepresented facts to the Court even though the Court was a party 
thereto and was aware that those facts were intentional misrepresentations. The facts 
intentionally misrepresented are set forth in a deposition of James Johnson and counsel for 
plaintiff's, Darwin Fisher. The Court found that the facts concerning the delay of trial were not 
misrepresentations by the plaintiff and the Court was certainly not aware of any 
misrepresentations if any were made. Plaintiffs had ample' opportunity to file an objection to 
the Findings and Conclusions in the Court's Order of Dismissal of this case. They failed to do 
so. 
Plaintiffs further state that they have moved this case forward and were ready for 
trial in November of 1992. This is contrary to the facts since prior to this time Darwin C. 
Fisher, who was then attorney for the plaintiff, filed a Motion to Withdraw based on a conflict 
of interest and on November 19, 1992, the Court signed a Memorandum Decision granting his 
request for withdrawal. Obviously the plaintiffs were not ready for trial as Mr. Richard Coxson 
had just entered as attorney for the plaintiff. After this Mr. Coxson filed a Motion for further 
discovery, many months after the cut off date for discovery had been ordered and further 
represented that he needed this discovery in order to familiarize himself with the case in that he 
had just entered the same. Obviously he was not ready for trial at that time, and further the 
Court has never refused to set the matter for trial. The plaintiffs' argument on these grounds 
falls far short for support of their Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59(b) U.R.C.P. The 
Court is not again going to review the factors it set forth in its Memorandum Decision 
dismissing this case nor as to the cases supporting those factors and the law in the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mr. Brian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion 
For New Trial on the grounds of failure to procedurally comply with services is denied on the 
grounds that they were served but failure to place their name on the Certificate of Service is not 
sufficient grounds. However, the Motion For Dismissal as to Mr. Brian by this Court in its 
prior decision will stand. 
2il 
Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare the appropriate Orders. 
DATED this of/p^- day of May, 
VENOY CWRISTOFpRSON 
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE 
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RICHARD C. COXSON (A5933) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ] 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ] 
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, ) 
Defendants. 
) REPLY 
i Civil 
1 Judge 
MEMORANDUM 
No. 900400460CN 
VeNoy Christoffersen 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs have brought this Motion to Set Aside a dismissal 
in this action for failure to prosecute in as much as the dismissal 
was ill founded and an abuse of discretion. 
FACTS 
1. Defendants were substantially at fault for a significant 
amount of the delays in this action. See Affidavit of James A. 
Johnson. 
2. Counsel for defendants agreed to notify the court of 
readiness for trial for November based upon their calendar 
availability after a phone conversation for prior counsel for 
plaintiffs, Darwin Fisher. See Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher. 
3. Prior counsel for plaintiffs, Darwin C. Fisher, attempted 
to verify the trial scheduled for November of 1992 with the court 
clerk, and was in fact informed that trial had been set for 
210 
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November of 1992. See Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher. 
4. It was only just prior to the withdrawal of Darwin C. 
Fisher that he became aware that the trial was not scheduled for 
November of 1992, and therefore trial setting would not bar his 
request for withdrawal of counsel. See Affidavit of Darwin Fisher. 
5. Defendants have on numerous occasions, including the 
Motion for Dismissal and this Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside 
Dismissal, intentionally misrepresented the facts. Those 
misrepresentations include: 
a. the existence of a policy of malpractice insurance; 
b. the actual ruling made by the Supreme Court with 
regard to the Interlocutory Appeal; 
c. the effect of the protective order decisions; and 
d. Judge Pat B. Brian's continued unavailability at 
numerous times when requests for discovery were made, which greatly 
inconvenienced plaintiffs, but which they acquiesced in simply to 
move this action along. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs are at present trying to have a dismissal set aside 
for failure to prosecute. It is contrary to law in the State of 
Utah, and which has been cited in prior memoranda, that a case 
which is ready for trial should be dismissed for want of 
prosecution on what is virtually the eve of trial. In this case, 
the trial court has abused its discretion and has dismissed a case 
which is ready to go to trial, the only reason for which it did not 
2 
2100 
go to trial being the failure of: 1) either the counsel for 
defendants to schedule with the court trial dates in November of 
1992 as agreed to and which they made representations that they 
would; 2) or the administrative failure of court itself to calendar 
the trial. Under the circumstances, it is almost incredible that 
plaintiffs should be punished for a failure over which they had 
absolutely not control. 
When it is further considered that counsels for defendants 
have intentionally misrepresented numerous facts in this case, the 
representations made by them in their Affidavit attached to the 
Memorandum in Opposition to this motion should be completely 
discounted due to their lack of credibility. In contract, prior 
counsel for plaintiffs, Darwin Fisher, has not made any 
misrepresentation in this action, nor has he made "self-serving" or 
otherwise skewed or false statements. Mr. Fisher's Affidavit is 
clear, his recollection is unimpaired, and his statements firmly 
support the proposition that Mr. Whyte and Mr. Dowdle took upon 
themselves the responsibility in a conference call to set trial for 
November 2-13, 1992. It is equally clear that no such action was in 
fact taken. Dismissal should therefore be set aside since no 
failure to prosecute has in fact occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fisher has a very clear recollection of the events, and 
has never misrepresented them to the court for any reason. Counsel 
for defendants can not make the same claim in as much as they have 
3 
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frequently misrepresented facts of many different types throughout 
this action. Mr. Fisher's Affidavit should therefore not be 
stricken, and dismissal should be set aside in as much as there was 
not failure to prosecute by plaintiffs. 
DATED this /r^day of /'(0L<^ , 1993. 
RICHftKtf C. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid to: 
Arthur J. Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for Defendants 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
A courtesy copy to: 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
875 Rio Virgin Drive, #217 
St. George, UT 84770 
DATED this day of ., 1993. 
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ] 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants. 
) MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT 
) NIELSEN & SENIOR IN | OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' | MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, pursuant to 
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration. 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This Court made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and entered a Judgment of Dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. on 
April 6, 1993. Plaintiffs filed no objections to the proposed 
Findings and Conclusions, although they later submitted their own 
proposed Findings after the Court had entered the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Having failed to take advantage of 
the opportunity to object, Plaintiffs now seek to set aside the 
Dismissal alleging intentional misrepresentation by Defendants 
and complicity by the Court. Nielsen & Senior denies that it has 
made any misrepresentation, and objects to Plaintiffs* 
allegations which are not supported by the record and are a 
reflection on the integrity of the Court and opposing counsel. 
2. Defendant Nielsen & Senior objects to Plaintiffs' 
statement of "Facts Intentionally Misrepresented" in its 
entirety. In many instances, the Affidavit of Darwin Fisher does 
not support the facts asserted in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum. See 
the Affidavit of Larry Whyte filed herewith and incorporated 
herein. 
3. Defendant Nielsen & Senior objects to the Affidavit of 
Darwin C. Fisher and has filed a separate Objection to its 
admission on the ground that Mr. Fisher could not testify, if 
called, to its contents because the statements are largely 
hearsay and inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 802. In the 
event that this Court determines to admit Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, 
Nielsen & Senior submits and requests the admission of the 
counteraffidavit of Larry L. Whyte. 
20246.NI211.8500 - 2 -
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL 
Rulings on motions for new trials are addressed to the sound 
discretion of the Court but, absent a showing of one of the 
grounds set forth in Rule 59, U. R. Civ. P., the Court has no 
discretion to grant a new trial. Hancock v. Planned Development 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990). Plaintiffs base their 
Motion, apparently, on a claim that Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
misrepresented facts to the Court so that entry of a judgment of 
dismissal based on those facts would constitute an irregularity 
entitling Plaintiffs to a new trial. Plaintiff's submitted 
affidavit fails, however, to make the required showing. 
In the first instance, there is no evidence of any 
irregularity in the briefing of and oral argument on Defendants• 
Motion to Dismiss. In fact, the issues raised by Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss were fully briefed and argued by the parties. 
Plaintiffs had full and complete opportunity to object to the 
proposed findings, if grounds therefor appeared in the record. 
The Judgment of Dismissal was entered after proceedings which 
were completely in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
- Procedure and the Code of Judicial Administration, and Plaintiffs 
have made no showing of irregularities. 
20246.NI211.8500 - 3 -
In the second instance, the affidavit of Plaintiffs former 
counsel is inaccurate, unsubstantiated, self-serving, and 
inadmissible as hearsay under Utah Rule of Evidence 802. As 
such, the affidavit does not suffice to establish grounds for a 
new trial. Defendant particularly objects to Mr. Fisher's use of 
the November 2, 1992, trial setting to his personal advantage and 
then as a basis of accusation against the Court. Counsel for the 
parties discussed a trial setting following the denial of 
Plaintiffs' Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, and settled on the 
dates November 2-13, 1992. It was Plaintiffs' obligation to file 
with the Court a Pre-trial Order incorporating those dates. 
Despite the fact that Defendants drafted several proposed Pre-
trial Orders and submitted them for Mr. Fisher's review, Mr. 
Fisher refused to cooperate and Plaintiffs never submitted to the 
Court a Pre-trial Order setting the trial dates. 
When Mr. Fisher wished to withdraw as counsel in October, 
1992, he relied on the fact that there was no trial setting to 
support his claim that there would be no delay of trial by his 
withdrawal. Using his failure to submit a Pre-trial Order to his 
advantage one more time, Mr. Fisher's present Affidavit 
speciously states that he thought the dates would be given to the 
Court and trial setting noticed by the Court. Based on Mr. 
Fisher's Affidavit, Plaintiffs now assert that the "Court 
20246.NI211.8500 - 4 -
refused" to set the matter for trial, and that they were at all 
times ready to proceed. 
These statements by Plaintiffs and their former counsel are 
inconsistent and do not provide reliable evidence to support 
Plaintiffsf claim of irregularity in the proceedings which 
resulted in the entry of the Judgment of Dismissal. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO ERROR OF LAW IN THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL 
As the second ground for their Motion for New Trial, 
Plaintiffs allude to an error in law. Defendant will not tax the 
patience of the Court to review, once again, the factors set 
forth in Westinghouse Electrical Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) and Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989). The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which supported the entry of the Judgment of 
Dismissal reveal the ample evidence in the record that Plaintiffs 
failed to proceed to prosecute their claims with the diligence 
required by the decision of this Court. By the submission of one 
Affidavit, replete with misstated dates and unsubstantiated by 
the record. Plaintiffs seek to persuade the Court that there is 
insufficient basis to sustain the Judgment. To the contrary, the 
papers and filings of record, including those attached as 
exhibits to Mr. Whyte's Affidavit, demonstrate the pattern of 
Plaintiffs' conduct with convincing clarity. Plaintiffs1 conduct 
20246. N1211.8500 - 5 -
is evidenced by every fact of record and supports the Judgment of 
Dismissal. There has been no error of law which would entitle 
Plaintiffs to have the judgment set aside. 
The Court's decision that the facts of this case warranted 
dismissal of the action is buttressed by an April 21, 1993 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. See, Country Meadows 
Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, Case No. 
920302-CA, (a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum). 
There the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure 
to prosecute based upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The 
court's decision acknowledged that "evaluation of a district 
court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is fact 
sensitive ..." Id. at 1# quoting from the prior case of Meadow 
Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah 
App. 1991). Further, the appellate court "will not interfere 
with that decision unless it clearly appears that there is a 
likelihood an injustice has been wrought." id. at 3, quoting 
Charlie Brown Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc.f 740 P.2d 
1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987). 
Country Meadows argued that dismissal of its case was error 
on two grounds, one of which is pertinent to Plaintiffs' present 
motion. Country Meadows claimed that the Defendants' own failure 
to move the case forward negated its right to the dismissal. The 
Court of Appeals determined that it was the conduct of the 
20246.NI211.8500 - 6 -
Plaintiff which was to be scrutinized. "Although inaction on the 
part of a defendant may contribute to the justifiability of the 
plaintiff's excuse for delay, the duty to prosecute is a duty of 
due diligence imposed on a Plaintiff, not on a defendant." Id. 
at 6, quoting Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1218. Accordingly, 
Nielsen & Senior was not required to take the leading role in 
moving the case forward and, insofar as Plaintiffs' Facts allege 
lack of initiative on Defendants* part, such allegations are 
irrelevant. 
Country Meadows provides further support for this Court's 
dismissal of the case: 
In applying the Westinohouse factors, the Utah 
Supreme Court required that the "totality of the 
circumstances" be considered to determine "[w]hether 
delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action." 
Department of Social Services v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 
1324 (Utah 1980). Therefore, a plaintiff cannot 
isolate and argue facts relevant to only one or two of 
the Westinghouse factors to avoid its burden "* to 
prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay,'" Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 
1218 (quoting Charlie Brown Construction. 740 P.2d at 
1370) . 
Country Meadows, at 5. 
Nielsen & Senior contends that Plaintiffs are attempting 
once again to do exactly what the Utah Supreme Court prohibits 
above. Plaintiffs have misstated certain facts regarding 
discovery and deposition proceedings in the case and then have 
used and re-used those to support their Motion. The "totality of 
the circumstances", however, is borne out by the Affidavit of 
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Larry L. Whyte and the entirety of papers and filings in this 
matter. Under the totality of the circumstances, there is no 
error of law in this Court's Dismissal of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits that there were no 
irregularities in the proceedings and that the record before the 
Court amply supports the Judgment of Dismissal. Plaintiffs have 
failed to make the necessary showing and, thus, the Court has no 
discretion to grant a new trial. Plaintiffs* Motion should be 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2flHl day of April, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
r\ 
^Arthur H. Nielsen 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^^Iday of April, 1993, I 
have served Defendants' MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by causing a 
true and correct copy of the same to be sent, through the United 
States mails, first-class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard C. Coxson, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
47lMAJb*toA> ftPlA^/dlAAlv.Mi 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Country Meadows Convalescent 
Center, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
APR 2 1 1993 
' Clerk of thA/%*,..* 
V. 
Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care 
Financing, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 920302-CA 
F I L E D 
(Apr i l 2 1 , 1993) 
Clerk of the Court 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for Appellant 
Jan Graham, Douglas W. Springmeyer, and J. 
Stephen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Petitioner, Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc. 
(Country Meadows), appeals the district court's dismissal of its 
petition for review of a decision by the Utah Department of 
Health (UDOH) and its grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOH. 
We affirm the dismissal for failure to prosecute based upon Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
BACKGROUND 
Because evaluation of a district court's decision to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute is fact sensitive, we present the facts 
in some detail. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 
1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). In February 1978, Ms. Eva S. Barney 
and her son, Carl W. Barney, formed a partnership to build the 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center, a nursing home in South 
Ogden, Utah, which would provide intermediate and skilled nursing 
care to Medicaid recipients. Carl Barney's construction company, 
Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538, 538 (Utah 1984). An appellate 
court, therefore, "will not interfere with that decision unless 
it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and 
that there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought." 
Charlie Brown Constr.r 740 P.2d at 1370 (citing Department of 
Soc. Serv. v, Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)). 
Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute 
On appeal, Country Meadows argues that the district court 
erred in dismissing its petition for review on two grounds: 
(1) UD0H/s own failure to move the district court appeal forward 
negated its right to the dismissal; and (2) the dismissal would 
create injustice by substantially prejudicing Country Meadows in 
subsequent Medicaid reimbursement matters.2 Having reviewed the 
record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting UDOH's motion for a dismissal of Country 
Meadows' petition, and that the dismissal did not cause 
substantial injustice. 
UDOH based its motion to dismiss on Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) which provides in pertinent part: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or any claim of action against him. 
Although Utah courts "consider[] a motion to dismiss to be a 
severe measure," Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 797 P.2d 
1096, 1097 (Utah 1990), Rule 41(b) requires plaintiffs "*to 
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty 
of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports 
Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987) (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 
1325 (Utah 1975)). See also Hill v. Dickerson, 197 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23, 24 (Utah App. 1992). '"Rule 41(b) sets no deadline for 
2. In its reply brief, Country Meadows also argued that Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 81(d) would foreclose the option of a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal as inconsistent with the "judicial review of a final 
determination of the executive director" of a state agency 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-1. Because presentation of 
this argument in a reply brief does not conform to "Rule 24(c) of 
the Appellate Rules of Procedure limit[ing] answers in a reply 
brief to new matter in the appellee's brief," we decline to 
consider this argument. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 
P.2d 1316, 1321 n.5 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 
(Utah 1992). 
920302-CA 3 
P.2d at 879)). See also K.L.C. Inc., 656 P.2d at 988; Utah Oil 
Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). 
In applying the Westinahouse factors, the Utah Supreme Court 
required that the "totality of the circumstances" be considered 
to determine "[w]hether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an 
action." Romero, 609 P.2d at 1324. Therefore, a plaintiff 
cannot isolate and argue facts relevant to only one or two of the 
Westinahouse factors to avoid its burden "*to prosecute a case in 
due course without unusual or unreasonable delay,/ff Meadow Fresh 
Farms, 813 P.2d at 1218 (quoting Charlie Brown Constr., 740 P.2d 
at 1370). 
Nevertheless, Country Meadows' argument focuses on just two 
of the Westinahouse factors: (1) the injustice which would result 
from the dismissal of the case, and (2) UDOH/s failure to 
independently move the case forward. Country Meadows points out 
that the injustice which might result from a dismissal is the 
most important of the Westinahouse evaluative factors. Romero, 
609 P.2d at 1324 (discussing Westinahouse, 544 P.2d at 879). 
Country Meadows then claims that it would suffer manifest 
injustice as a result of dismissal because it refrained from 
moving forward on subsequent reimbursement claims submitted to 
UDOH, pending resolution of this matter. 
However, we do not believe that Country Meadow/s decision to 
compound one course of procrastination with another constitutes 
the type of injustice intended to be prevented by Westinahouse or 
Romero. In fact, even where a trial court finds facts indicating 
that "injustice could result from the dismissal of [a] case," it 
can dismiss when a plaintiff has "had more than ample opportunity 
to prove his asserted interest and simply failed to do so." 
Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240. Country Meadows has failed to offer 
any persuasive or legitimate reason for failing to take steps to 
advance its petition for over five years. It also has not 
demonstrated an inability to pursue the delayed reimbursement 
claims at this time. Therefore, in reviewing the dismissal of 
this case, we are not persuaded that Country Meadows' subsequent 
inaction on other reimbursement claims weighs compellingly in 
favor of our finding an abuse of discretion by the district 
court. 
Country Meadows next asks this court to focus on the 
behavior of UDOH, claiming that UDOH had "every opportunity to 
move the case forward" including the potential to request the 
district court to either issue an order to show cause or calendar 
a scheduling conference. In support of this argument, Country 
Meadows quotes from Romero which noted "the important fact [] 
that the defendant himself did nothing to move the case forward, 
but appears to be quite contented to let it lie dormant." 
920302-CA 5 
inactivity prior to its motion to dismiss do not constitute a 
reasonable excuse for Country Meadows' lack of diligence in 
pursuing its petition for review. Further, Country Meadows' non-
action for over five years indicates that the district court did 
not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in dismissing this action. 
When a "trial court has provided plaintiffs %an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice,' and that plaintiff abuses its 
opportunity through inexcusable neglect, the trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case." Charlie Brown 
Constr.. 740 P.2d at 1371 (citations omitted). 
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Country Meadows' case against UDOH, that dismissal 
"^operates as an adjudication upon the merits' of the case." 
Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b)5). See also Charlie Brown Constr., 740 
P.2d at 1371 (affirming the dismissal of an action "with 
prejudice and on the merits"). Because dismissal of an action 
under 41(b) "is dispositive of the case," Maxfield, 779 P.2d at 
241, we need not consider the district court's decision on the 
merits of UDOH's motion for summary judgment. See also Schonev 
v. Memorial Estates, Inc.. 790 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1990) 
("Because the court's entry of default judgment is fully 
supported . . . we need not address the issue of whether the 
entry of summary judgment was also proper in this case."). 
CONCLUSION 
Because Country Meadows failed to provide any reasonable 
justification for its failure to prosecute the case against UDOH 
for over five years, we affirm the district court's dismissal of 
that action based upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The 
5. The language in Rule 41(b) relevant to the effect of a 
dismissal states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule . . . operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits." 
920302-CA 7 
FILED IN 
4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATr OF UTAH 
UTAi' l/>UNTY 
RTCMARD C COXSON (AS933) 
Atlorney for Plaintiffs 
?75 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT P4660 
(801 ) 798-^74 
IN HIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APR IB i| 58 Pfi '93 
0k 
TAMFS A JOHNSON ^r\d 
jrNNTFTR I TOHNSON, 
Plai nt i ffs , 
vs „ 
NTELSEN ^ s rNTOR, a U t a h 
C o r p o r a t i o n anc\ PAT B. B R I A N , 
He Pendants -
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER 
RULE 59 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Plaintiffs move For new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civ/il Procedure For misconduct on the part of defendants 
and error in Jaw Plaintiffs more Fully set out their grounds in 
1 he all ached Memorandum. 
DATED this U; day of Jofcr-r/l , 1993-
1^"^ ,Vr mil V'<Tr^"""^'^S——•Turrmmtmn 
RIGHARD'C. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801 ) 798-3574 
1805 
Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone (801) 531-0060 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
V . j 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ) 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
| Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., came on for hearing before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to 
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as 
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration. The 
following appearances were entered: Richard C. Coxson for 
Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P. 
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior; 
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian. Chris L. 
FILED IN 
4™ DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
JPB G 9 35 AH "93 
Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having 
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs 
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
made its oral ruling on the matter on March 11, 1993. The Court, 
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now 
HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs* Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. is 
hereby granted and Plaintiffs' complaint and said action be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the 
merits. 
Costs are awarded to Defendants. 
DATED this ? day of &/>7«t^ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v.
 ; 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ) 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ] 
Defendants. ; 
) DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' | MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, 
Defendants Nielsen & Senior and Pat B. Brian, by and through 
their counsel of record, submit the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE ARE FALSE AND 
IRRELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS BEFORE THE COURT 
Plaintiffs allege, in Point I of their responsive 
memorandum, that Defendants have continued to harass and defame 
Plaintiffs by contacting government agencies, a mortgagee, 
Plaintiffs' neighbors and the defendants in the personal injury 
suit brought by Plaintiffs. Defendants deny each and every such 
allegation, with a single exception: Defendants openly contacted 
counsel representing the defendants of Plaintiffs• personal 
injury case to determine whether the emotional damages claimed by 
Plaintiffs in that action overlapped the emotional damages 
claimed by Plaintiffs in the instant case. Plaintiffs are 
obviously unable to document any of the remaining allegations, as 
they have not made a single citation to the record in support of 
their assertions. While Defendants have engaged in appropriate 
pre-trial discovery, Defendants deny that they have engaged in 
any conduct which has been improper or which could be construed 
to be harassment or defamation of Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' unsupported allegations are, moreover, 
irrelevant to the matters before this Court. Only two causes of 
action remain to be tried, framed as claims for breach of 
contract and for malpractice and springing from the same core of 
operative fact. Point I of Plaintiffs' response, however, 
contains the following language: "As Plaintiffs attempt to nail 
down all of the tortious conduct by Defendants, and resolve them 
18566.NI211.8500 
- 2 -
[sic] within this one action so that they can get on with their 
lives . . . . " It appears that Plaintiffs intend to assert 
additional claims against Defendants, presumably, by amendment of 
the Second Amended Complaint. 
Defendants strenuously object to any proposal by Plaintiffs 
to amend their Complaint to include additional causes of action. 
Amendment to include such specious claims can only be for the 
purpose of pressuring defendants to settle with plaintiffs. It 
would result in precisely the delay Defendant Brian anticipated 
in his opposition to the Motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, Darwin 
Fisher, to withdraw, and would create additional support for 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute. Any 
effort by Plaintiffs to expand their claims clearly indicates 
that Plaintiffs are not ready for trial. See concurring opinion 
of J. Orme, Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO MAKE DILIGENT 
EFFORT TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH THE CASE 
Plaintiffs* counsel filed his Notice of Appearance not on 
December 22, 1992, as Plaintiffs alleged, but on October 26, 
1992. A copy of the Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
His appearance was acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 
1992. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". Counsel has had nearly four months to become 
familiar with the posture of this case. Counsel should be aware 
that the discovery cut-off date was May 1, 1992, and that this 
- 3 -
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Court clearly stated, in its Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 
1992 and Order of June, 1992, that no exceptions would be 
permitted. Instead, on February 17, 1993, Plaintiffs submitted 
to Defendants forty (40) requests for admissions, arguing that 
they will be prepared for trial after responses to the requests 
are received. 
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' request for admissions and 
move for a protective order and for sanctions against Plaintiffs 
pursuant to Rules 26, 36, and 37, U. R. Civ. P. The requests are 
untimely, objectionable on the face, and the subject matter of 
each has previously been addressed by Defendants. For the 
purposes of this Reply, counsel's lack of diligence and complete 
lack of familiarity with the case is demonstrated by the filing 
of the discovery requests. 
Since his entering the case on October 26, 1992, counsel has 
had ample time to ascertain the discovery cut-off date set by the 
Court. No discovery can be filed without obtaining leave of 
Court, which this Court has, on prior occasions, refused to 
grant. Counsel's failure to request leave of court indicates a 
lack of respect for the Court's orders or a total lack of 
familiarity with the case. There is no doubt that Plaintiffs' 
counsel filed these Requests for Admissions as a subterfuge, to 
cover up his failure to make a thorough review of the pleadings, 
motions and orders on file. 
As a result of counsel's lack of diligence and familiarity 
with the case, Plaintiffs have filed motions without basis in 
fact or law, served objectionable discovery demands, and made 
- 4 -
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further unsupported allegations against defendants. Plaintiffs1 
conduct supports Defendants' Motion. 
POINT III 
DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO RULE 4 1(b), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Without repeating the arguments of the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendants* Motion to Dismiss, 
Defendants point out that Plaintiffs' submission of discovery 
requests at this point in the case increases the factual 
similarity between the present case and Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989). In Maxfield, the plaintiff filed a 
Complaint and then amended it twice, each adding new theories of 
the case. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and 
filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial court's refusal to 
grant it. The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court. Two of 
Plaintiffs' attorneys withdrew from representation. P]aintiff 
objected to all three of the trial dates set. When Plaintiff 
moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time, 
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed 
the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely 
manner. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 239. The dismissal was 
affirmed on appeal. 
The present case is factually indistinguishable from 
Maxfield. Plaintiffs' submission of extensive discovery requests 
at this late hour coupled with the suggestion that a motion for 
leave to amend the Complaint yet again to "nail down all of the 
tortious conduct by defendants, and resolve them [sic] within 
- 5 -
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this one action" is impending, places Plaintiffs squarely within 
the ambit of Maxfield. Because Plaintiffs' failure to proceed 
with diligence is inexcusable not only from the parties' 
standpoint, but also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial 
process, dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Resolution of this matter is long overdue. For the reasons 
set forth above and in Defendants' prior Memorandum, Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute 
should be granted. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Defendants request an opportunity to present oral argument 
at a time convenient to the Court and counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Arthur H. Niels 
Larry L. Whyte 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior 
:hael L. Dowdle Micha dlc 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
18566.NI211.8500 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNTFER 
I, . JOHNSON, (Probate No. PR-86-502, 
Fourth District), 
Plaintiffs, 
v< 
NIELSEN & SENTOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN, and 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 90040460 CN 
BACKGROUND 
Present counsel has only recently begun representation in this 
matter. Prior counsel had to withdraw due to a conflict of interest 
which he determined existed between the interests of plaintiffs in 
other matters pending in his office and other clients whom he 
represents. Because of the complexity of this case, and the 
continued malicious acts of defendants, plaintiffs are entitled to 
further time to prepare for trial. 
FACTS 
1. Present counsel entered Notice of Appearance on December 
22, 1992. 
2. Prior counsel withdrew representation due to a conflict 
of interest between plaintiffs and other matters pending in prior 
counself s office. 
3. Defendants are continuing to interfere with plaintiffs1 
business interests and are continuing to defame plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
There Has Been No Inaction In This Case 
Defendants1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss is 
based upon an argument of inaction by plaintiffs. The problem with 
this argument is that they know that the argument is fallacious and 
is made in bad faith. Plaintiffs are continuing to receive 
harassment by defendants in the following forms: (1) The F.B.I, has 
been contacted by defendants regarding past business associations 
of the plaintiffs with other individuals; (2) The Small Business 
Administration has been contacted by defendants; (3) The Utah 
Department of Securities has been contacted by defendants regarding 
plaintiffs; (4) Ecclesiastical leaders of plaintiffs have been 
contacted by defendants to pressure them into dropping this action; 
(5) Mortgage lenders and trustee holders of plaintiffs' home have 
been contacted to foreclosure on plaintiffs; (6) Opposing parties 
in personal injury actions have been contacted by defendants; and 
(6) Defendants have defamed plaintiffs to their neighbors and other 
associates . 
The above well documented actions are malicious and are a 
direct outgrowth of this action. As plaintiffs attempt to nail down 
all of the tortious conduct by defendants, and resolve them within 
2 
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Plaintiff's Seconded (SIC) Complaint, the facts are definitely 
disputed. The facts are not as set out and do not support 
defendants. 
With regard to the first factor, defendants have undertaken to 
destroy plaintiffs' lives by attacking them both with the judicial 
system, the police, their business associates, their ecclesiastical 
relations, and their neighbors. Plaintiffs have tried to mitigate 
this damage as well as document what defendants have been doing, 
and involuntary dismissal would be to reward this egregious 
conduct. 
Second, the opportunity to move the case forward. Both pnilies 
have had the opportunity to move the case forward, and both parties 
have moved the case forward during the last two and a half (2 1/2) 
years. Defendants have not shovm candor by their statements to the 
contrary, and, unfortunately, taken in light of their inability to 
understand simple adoption laws, is to be expected. 
Third, each party has moved the case forward. It is undisputed 
that both parties have conducted discovery, and that defendants are 
now ready for trial. However, defendants' readiness for trial does 
not indicate that plaintiffs are not entitled to complete 
preparations of their case. Plaintiffs will shortly be prepared for 
trial after response to discovery which has just been sent out. 
Fourth, the difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused 
to the other side. Plaintiffs appreciate that the defendants have 
been greatly aggravated by being involved in this law suit and that 
4 
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this one action so that they can get on with their lives, 
defendants blithely are claiming that they are without fault and 
that the progress of this action is entirely due to plaintiffs. 
Defendants, however, are acting with "unclean hands" which acts are 
intended to be harassing, and are certainly the type Rule 11 was 
meant to deal with. Plaintiffs are not intent on Rule 11 sanctions, 
but simply that they be allowed to resolve the issues in this case. 
Plaintiffs are moving as quickly as possible to resolve these 
issues, and have submitted their last discovery to defendants in 
order to be prepared for trial. 
POINT 11 
Dismissal Is An Abusive Discretion 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) is the precedential case 
with regard to involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute. The 
factors discussed in Westinghouse were set out in detail in Meadow 
Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P. 2d 1216 (Utah App. 
1991), which five factors are: first, the conduct of the parties; 
second, the opportunity each party has had to move the case 
forward; third, what each party has done to move the case forward; 
fourth, the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been 
caused to the other side; and fifth, most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Contrary to defendants1 arguments in the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
3 
it has been difficult to complete some aspects of the discovery. 
However, plaintiffs have also been aggravated in that defendants 
have continually sought protective orders and refused to provide 
relevant discovery so that plaintiffs' case might go forward. 
Plaintiffs believe that both sides are about even on this issue. 
Fifth, injustice from dismissal, this would clearly fall in 
favor of plaintiffs in as much as they have been aggrieved by the 
incompetent representation of defendants which consequentially 
resulted in the destruction of their health, their business, and 
other relationships. The courts have consistently ruled that 
litigating the issues is much more important than simple 
administrative clean up when things are slow. 
*
n
 Westinghouse, the court held that: 
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give 
proper weight to the priority; and that under the 
circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal 
was an abusive discretion. It is therefore necessary that 
they were to be vacated and the case remain remanded 
forth for further proceedings. Westinqhouse, 544 P. 2d at 
879. 
Plaintiffs have nearly*prepared their case for trial, and once 
discovery is completed are willing to proceed. In as much as there 
as been a continual movement forward for trial during the entire 
period, and defendants have not been prejudiced, dismissal is 
improper. 
5 
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CONCLUSION 
Dismissal is improper except in the most egregious 
circumstances. Defendants have failed to show that the present 
circumstances are egregious, and the facts are in dispute. 
Dismissal of this action is therefore improper and of abuse and 
discretion. 
DATED this L/jday of / ~ {° J^^U^T^yf , 1993. 
RICHAR&^C. COXSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
(801) 798-3574 
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Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025) 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone (801) 531-0060 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN 8c SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, and Pat B. Brian, 
Defendants, 
JOINDER OF DEFENDANT PAT B. 
BRIAN IN MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
AND CONDITIONAL MOTION 
TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Defendant Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel, hereby joins 
in the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. 
Defendant Pat B. Brian further conditionally moves this Court, if 
and in the event that Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, to 
dismiss the Counterclaim of Defendant Pat B. Brian in order to 
provide a final adjudication of all issues pending in this matter, 
conditioned that if Plaintiffs' Complaint is ever restored or 
reinstated, for any reason whatsoever, Defendant's Counterclaim 
shall automatically be restored and reinstated. 
DATED this r - dav^  of February, 1993. 
/tksStittUt 
Michael L. Dowdle 
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian 
Arthur H, Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v • 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
) COMPLAINT 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
) Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
through its counsel of record, Arthur H. Nielsen and Larry L. 
Whyte, Defendant Nielsen & Senior moves the Court to dismiss with 
prejudice and on the merits Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to 
prosecute their claim with diligence. This Motion is supported 
by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith. 
- 9 
DATED this ^ ^ ^ d a y of February, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^*J\ day of February, 1993, I 
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, first-
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed as follows: 
Richard C, Coxson, A5933 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
17955.NI211.8500 
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and ; 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ; 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah ; 
Corporation, Pat B. Brian, ; 
Defendants. 
i MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
i AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
1 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
1 DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED 
1 AMENDED COMPLAINT 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
i Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended 
Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendants submit the following facts which are established 
by the record of this matter: 
1. In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their counsel, 
Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims for 
several thousand dollars allegedly spent by Plaintiffs to 
finalize the adoption at issue in this case. Shortly thereafter, 
Mr. Robinson discontinued his representation of Plaintiffs. 
4THPIS%^ 
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2. In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of Howard, Lewis and 
Petersen, made contact with Defendants to assert Plaintiffs1 
claims regarding the adoption. At this time, Plaintiffs were 
demanding payment of $47,000.00. Defendants met with Mr. Lambert 
to discuss the possible resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. On 
February 17, 1989, Mr. Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was 
terminated by Plaintiffs. 
3. In 1989, Plaintiffs contacted officials of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to bring pressure to bear 
upon Defendant Brian to capitulate to Plaintiffs' demands. 
Meetings were held between Plaintiffs, Defendant Brian, and 
Church officials. During this period, Plaintiffs alternated 
claiming that they were representing themselves or that they had 
retained counsel. At this time, Plaintiffs set their claims at 
an amount in excess of $87,000.00. 
4. Plaintiffs' original complaint in this matter was 
filed, pro se, on June 22, 1990. It contained claims for 
negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, 
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and breach of contract, and sought damages of an 
undisclosed amount. On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed 
their first Amended Complaint, which contained the same claims 
for relief. 
17969.NI211.8500 
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5. During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs 
claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them 
against Defendants. Plaintiffs publicized the matter by 
contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets 
of information which contained, among other things, their claims 
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar. 
6. On or about July 13, 1990, Defendants received a letter 
from D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to 
represent Plaintiffs in this matter. Mr. Waite1s letter proposed 
settlement of the claims for $180,000.00, and expressed his 
anticipation that the media attention already given to the case 
would increase due to Judge Brian's position. Plaintiffs later 
denied that Mr. Waite represented them. 
7. Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on 
or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the 
Plaintiffs' depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990. On 
August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold 
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder & 
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and 
the scheduled depositions were postponed until they could become 
familiar with the case. 
8. On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard 
filed Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional 
17969.NI211.8500 
- 3 -
malpractice, breach of contract, negligence and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
9. The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began 
on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was 
originally scheduled. The deposition lasted for three (3) days, 
until November 30, 1990, at which time a rift developed between 
Plaintiffs and their counsel over the course of the discovery and 
the case in general. The deposition was adjourned by Plaintiffs' 
counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill. 
10. On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard 
withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in 
person on January 18, 1991. 
11. On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he anticipated entering his 
appearance as counsel of record for Plaintiffs, and inquiring 
regarding a resolution of this matter by settlement. 
Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary discussions, Mr. 
Irvine did not enter an appearance for Plaintiffs as counsel in 
the case. 
12. A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court on 
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April 16, 1991. The conference was continued when Darwin C. 
Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher entered an appearance on behalf 
of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991. 
13. A new scheduling and settlement conference was 
scheduled by the Court on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah. This 
conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991, and Plaintiffs' 
counsel demurred on all discussions of a resolution of the case 
due to his need to familiarize himself with the case. A 
scheduling order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991, 
setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation 
and pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10, 
1992. 
14. Notwithstanding Defendants * numerous attempts to 
complete Plaintiffs' depositions, continuation of the deposition 
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991. 
The reasons given for the delay were that Mr. Fisher was unable 
to become sufficiently familiar with facts of the case before the 
deposition. The deposition examination was finally concluded on 
October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun. 
15. A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December 6, 
1991, regarding Defendants* motions to dismiss, or in the 
alternative for summary judgment as to various of the causes of 
action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. At the hearing, 
also, the parties discussed resolution of the case. Mr. Fisher 
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requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until 
later that month. Various scheduling dates were again set. 
16. Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992, 
Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim. 
Upon motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, the trial date of February 
18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5 through 14, 
1992. 
17. In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions 
to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second 
Amended Complaint. Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992, 
counsel for Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial 
date set for May on the basis that discovery was still necessary 
to complete preparations for trial, that counsel could not be 
ready for the trial in so short a time, and that certain 
conflicts existed which necessitated that the date be re-set. 
Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike the trial 
date was granted by the Court. A new trial date was set for 
November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was extended 
through May, 1992. 
18. In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory order of the trial Court with regard to its rulings 
dismissing certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint. On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order 
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striking the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without 
date. The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition on 
May 21, 1992. 
19. During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of 
taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby. On the date scheduled, 
Ms. Magleby did not appear. Counsel agreed to reschedule the 
deposition. Thereafter, Plaintiffs cancelled Ms. Magleby's 
deposition. 
20. Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the 
deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to 
cooperate in making Ms. Magleby available for the deposition. 
Defendants were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose 
Ms. Magleby after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it 
was Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which delayed the scheduling of 
the deposition. The deposition was set for June 30, 1990. 
Plaintiffs moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their 
counsel would be unable to attend. The matter was argued to the 
court on June 25, 1992, and an Order entered that the deposition 
proceed as scheduled. 
21. Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case 
forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in 
February, 1992, approximately one year ago. 
22. The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the 
last action on the case. 
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23. On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for 
a leave to withdraw as Plaintifffs counsel. Defendant Brian 
opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay, prejudicial to 
Defendants, would ensue. Mr. Fisher's Motion was granted and the 
appearance of Richard Coxson as counsel for Plaintiffs was 
acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992. 
24. Defendants have not asked for a continuance at any time 
during these protracted proceedings and have consistently 
represented to the Court their readiness for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PLAINTIFFS1 DILATORY CONDUCT WARRANTS 
DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS 
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers this 
Court to dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for 
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute. "The burden is upon the 
Plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or 
unreasonable delay." Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. v. 
Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987) 
(quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation 
Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)). Plaintiffs must 
"prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty 
of dismissal." Id., (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 
1325 (Utah 1975)). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a 
decision within the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. 
- 8 -
17969.NI211.8500 
The Court of Appeals has held that it will not interfere with the 
trial court's decision unless it clearly appears that the Court 
has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood that 
injustice resulted. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with 
guidance on Rule 41(b) dismissals in Westinghouse Electrical 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 
(Utah 1975). In that case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b) 
dismissal for failure to prosecute and identified the factors to 
be considered in determining whether such a dismissal is 
appropriate. Those factors were articulated recently by the 
Court of Appeals as follows: 
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in 
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the 
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1) 
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each 
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each 
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount 
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to 
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether 
injustice may result from the dismissal." 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 
(Utah App. 1991). The following facts of Plaintiffs' conduct are 
undisputed and establish that dismissal is proper, pursuant to 
Westinghouse. 
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A. Plaintiffs' conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement of 
this matter to trial while Defendants have consistently 
moved the case forward. 
As the facts of this Memorandum illustrate, Plaintiffs have 
failed to move the case forward. Plaintiffs have been 
represented by numerous attorneys in this matter, the withdrawal 
of each resulting in delay. Plaintiffs have amended their 
Complaint twice, and have, three times, requested a continuance 
of a trial setting. Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition was 
rescheduled several times and finally completed more than a year 
after noticed. In April, 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court a petition for interlocutory appeal, which required 
that the fourth trial setting for November, 1992, be stricken. 
Although the petition was denied and Plaintiffs were free to 
proceed with their case, Plaintiffs have taken no action at all 
since February, 1992. 
Even this abbreviated listing of facts demonstrates the 
Plaintiffs• lack of determination to move the case forward to 
trial. Defendants, however, have proceeded with the case, 
pursuing discovery, narrowing the issues for trial by Motion, and 
consistently representing to the Court their readiness for trial. 
Defendants have moved the case forward whenever there has been 
'opportunity to do so. 
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B. Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case with diligence 
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to 
pleadings, reluctant compliance with Defendants' discovery 
requests and inability to go forward with trial when set have 
greatly increased Defendants' burden of defending this action• 
Defendants have been deprived of the benefits of a prompt 
resolution of the claims against them. Delay has made the 
presentation of evidence at trial more difficult, prejudicing 
Defendants, whose defenses require the accurate testimony of 
third parties who may become unavailable with the passage of 
time. Further, delay has unnecessarily increased the cost of 
defense. 
Defendants have lived more than five and one-half years with 
the Plaintiffs' threats and harrassment. Defendants have 
prepared to respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits but 
Plaintiffs have stalled every effort to place the matter before 
the Court. 
C. Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or accept 
the penalty of dismissal. Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. 
v. Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d at 1370. Such dismissal 
is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs' conduct alone that invites 
dismissal or could have avoided it. The Plaintiffs in this case 
have shown no determination to get their claims resolved on the 
- 11 -
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merits. Presumably, they are aware of the consequences of their 
lack of diligence. 
Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the 
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial 
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in 
court." Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 
1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). Notwithstanding, when the facts of 
this matter are evaluated against the factors set forth in 
Westinghouse, dismissal is, clearly, just. 
II 
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WOULD BE CONSISTENT 
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF UTAH COURTS 
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield1s 
Complaint for lack of prosecution. The facts considered by the 
Court were these: The plaintiff filed his Complaint in 1980 and 
amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case. Id. 
at 239. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and 
filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial Court's refusal to 
grant it. The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court. Two of 
plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from representation. Plaintiffs 
objected to all three of the trial dates set. When plaintiff 
moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time, 
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed 
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the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely 
manner. Id. 
The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts in light of the 
Westinghouse factors, stating that "there is more to consider in 
determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper 
than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed." 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 237 (quoting Westinghouse 
Electrical Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879). With regard to the 
issue of injustice, the court held: 
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result 
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose 
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property 
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its 
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample 
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply 
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not 
only from the standpoint of the parties, but also 
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240-241. It is apparent that 
the court did not equate the activity in the case with timely 
prosecution. 
The special concurrence of Judge Orme is particularly 
pertinent to the case at hand. The concurring opinion identified 
the following conduct of plaintiff as determinative: 
Maxfield1s latest counsel's motion for leave to 
withdraw coupled with his motion for leave to file yet 
another amended complaint constituted, taken together, 
a concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being 
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even 
though the action had been pending for the better part 
of a decade. It is the length of time this action had 
been pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious 
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unreadiness that makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate 
in this case. 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 241. 
Plaintiffs began a course of threats and harrassment toward 
Defendants nearly five and one-half years ago. Defendants 
received demands for payment, by Plaintiffs or by counsel on 
their behalf, for nearly three years before the original 
Complaint was filed. The action has been pending for two and 
one-half years, during which time Defendants have diligently 
prepared for trial. Plaintiffs have not prepared for trial, but 
have pressed Defendants with their demands for ever increasing 
amounts of damages. Defendants are entitled to an end to 
threats, by resolution of this matter. 
This Court is, also, entitled to relief. As in Maxfield, 
Plaintiffs• nonaction is inexcusable not only from Defendants• 
standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the judicial 
process. Dismissal, therefore, would be consistent with the 
precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
The Westinghouse factors remain the standard governing 
dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte. an 
action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon 
motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b). Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State 
University. 813 P.2d 1216 1219 (Utah App. 1991). As Defendants 
have demonstrated above, an excimination of the facts of this case 
in light of those factors supports dismissal of this action with 
- 14 -
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prejudice and on the merits. It is within this Court's 
discretion to grant Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Resolution of this matter is long overdue. For the reasons 
set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint for failure to prosecute should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of February, 1993. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
By vtfA/u4jn>^ 
Arthnr H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
Marilynn P. Fineshriber 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & 
Senior 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 1993, I 
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, first-
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED AMENDED COMPLAINT 
addressed as follows: 
Richard C. Coxson, A5933 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
275 North Main 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
TfWuJl/^^ 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN, 
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT PAT B. BRIAN'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Plaintiffs, James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson by and 
through their attorney of record, Darwin C. Fisher, and hereby 
submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Pat B. 
Brian's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. In approximately August or September of 1989, Pat B. 
Brian contacted Mark J. Howard, Stake President of James Johnson 
who was serving as a bishop in a BYU ward under the authority and 
direction of Mr. Howard. Pat Brian also contacted Richard Stowe, 
the Plaintiffs Stake President in the Plaintiffs home ward of the 
same church. Defendant contacted Mark Howard and Richard Stowe 
without the consent or knowledge of the Plaintiffs. See 
Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Tacts No. 6. 
2. In the meeting with Mark Howard, Defendant Pat Brian told 
Mark Howard that the Johnson's were not telling the truth and 
witnesses would be brought forth to prove that the Plaintiffs were 
not telling the truth, that the Plaintiffs have been involved in 
several law suits thus Defendant was implying that the Johnsons 
have brought this suit against Pat Brian only to gain money from 
Defendant Pat Brian through legal process to which they were not 
entitled and had done this not only to Pat Brian but to others. 
3. Defendant Pat Brian, or an individual on behalf of 
Defendant Pat Brian contacted Alden Porter, a member of the Second 
Quorum of the Seventies in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints. As a result of the contact, Alden Porter contacted Mark 
Howard concerning the discussions Mark Howard had with the 
Johnsons. 
4. As a result of the conversations between Mark Howard and 
Defendant Pat Brian and others on behalf of Pat Brian, Mark Howard 
informed the Johnsons that it was his opinion that they should 
settle the matter for the amount of $30,000.00. 
5. Mark Howard was contacted by Arthur Nielsen, a principle 
in the firm of Nielsen & Senior and told that Pat Brian had indeed 
made a mistake, but it was a small mistake. 
1241 
6. Alden Porterf a • . - ; . t 
or a representative of Pat Brian contacted James Johnson and 
requested from him information regarding tin- law r^ilt between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Pat Brian and encou ,.,.*• * 
settle. 
7. Defendant Pat Brian was fully aware of the bonding * .-,«;. 
was taking place between the Plaintiffs 1 
frequent contact w1lit Plaintiff James Johnson ^ - > awaie 
of the bonding that took place in the Plaintiffs family with the 
minor child. 
0 Defendant Pat Brian informed the Plaintiffs that there 
were no problems with the adoption and the Plaintiffs need only to 
wait the period of six months for the ad . . 
filed, when in fact, the Defendant Pat Brian had done nothing to 
secure the consent of the natural mother nor finalize the 
adoption proceedings leaving the Plaintifi 
minor child could be taken from their presence at any time jJ the 
natural mo t h e r. 
9 The Plaintiffs have suffered seyoit* <»inol 11 nil Il I i <i i i i n . i . 
I 0 Defendant Pat Brian personally or through representatives 
contacted representatives of the FBI and SBA in order to Influence 
the Plaintiffs to diminish lln-ii nait. 
Plaintiffs did not write to or speak with Stuart GJ azi er 
3 
outrageous. The Sanuns' holding has been reaffirmed in White v 
Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah App. 1990), In Re Estate of Grimm, 
7 04 I • 2( 1 J 2 3 1 ) (• I• :. ;• J. I \ j: »}r J 9£ 9 ) • j u 1 Beiser v Lohner. J 
(Utah 1982). 
POINT II 
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER 
DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL STRESS UPON THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to support a Cause of Action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the Plaintiff must i !.-: 
Outrageous conduct by the Defendant; 
2. The Defendant's intent to cause, or the reckless 
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 
distress; 
3. Severe emotional distress; 
4. An actual or proximate causal link between the tortuous 
conduct and the emotional distress. White v Blackburn, 
supra. 
Plaintiff must show the offensive behavior " ve been 
perpetuated by \lie Defendant with the purpose inflicting 
emotional distress or where any reasonable perecim w »/>• IN.-WII 
that such would result and Defendants' actions aie of sue!I a ilature 
as to be considered ul iiKj<M,nis and intolerable in that they offend 
6 
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-" several occasions regarding Defendant Pat Brian during the 
Spring, Summer and Fall of 1989. See Defendants' Statement of 
I In in I i s | n i l I ill I a t i „ Hi „ / 
12. Plaintiffs did not repeatedly insist during 1989 that 
Stuart Glazier arrange and participate in a meeting between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant r»nt In i tin i eqai cl i ni| i. • y tae 
Plaintiffs against him. See Defendant's Statement :t Undisputed 
Facts No. 3. 
Plaintiffs did leaten to file a Il  i , t \ EII i :i t aga:i nst' 
Defendant Brian if he did not pay a large sum of money to 
Plaintiffs in the meeting with Stuart Glazier. See Defendant's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts lie 5. 
J ) , Plaintiffs, during the meeting with Stuart Glazier, did 
not confirm for Defendant Brian the business address of Richard 
Stowe in Draper, Utah, and suggest the he meet wi th and cli sciiu i I In; 
Plaintiffs allegations with Richard Stowe. See Defendant's 
Statement of 1 11 td i s p t 11< 2c I Facts No. 7 . 
15. Mr Mark Howard was requested by Defendant M In IMH» 'in.iyu 
the Plaintiffs to settle this matter. See Defendant's Statement of; 
Undisputed Facts No. 10, 19 and 20, 
ISSUE I 
IS DEFENDANT PAT BRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
4 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS? 
LAW 
A Motion for Suinmaiy Judgment should be denied when* 1 ho 
evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact. Young v 
Felornia, 212 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862, Cert, den., 344 U.S. 
886, 73 S.Ct. 186, 97 L.Ed. 685, (1952); Ruffinenao v Miller, 
579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) . 
POINT I 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ll Hin)GMlXkD AS 
A TORT IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DISCUSSION 
The State of Utah allows recovery for «» mlnnl mual 
infliction of emotional distress without a showing of physical 
injury. 
"The best considered view recognizes an action for severe 
emotional distress though not accompanied by bodily 
impact or physical impact or physical injury, where 
Defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward 
the Plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or, (b) any reasonable person would 
have known that such would result; and his actions are of 
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and 
intolerable in that they offend against the generally 
accepted standaids of decency and morality." Samms v 
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961); See 
also White v Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah App. 1990); 
In Re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 173R (Utah App. 1989). 
The Samms' holding corresponds with Section 46(3) I I he 
Restatement of Torts ?d and lion provides ;•. I "MI for 
determining whether the Defendants actions w« .J f ficiently 
5 
against generally accepted standard?; ml di-Mienr f . 
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed <*. bounds 
of that usually toleratecI in a civilized community. White v 
Blackburn, supra. 
I\ 01 JTRAGEOUS CONDUCT BY DEFENDANT 
The element of outrageous conduct is 
characteristic of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Whether Defendant ;» conduct was sufficiently outrageous io a 
principle focus of the Court's inquiry in delei m i n i itq whether a 
valid cause of action exists. 
Defendants outrageous conduct may arise in different ways 1ml., 
the acts complained of must offend against aei ed 
standards of decency and morality. Mere insults, indignities, 
threats, annoyances, petty oppression trivialities are 
sufficient to support a cause of action. Restatemen V* 
S ec t J c omme n t u \ i i? u ^ j . 
Outrageous conduct has been found where the circumstances of 
the case are unusually aggravated In Samms v Eccles, siipra, the 
Court found that Defendant's offensive solicitations to engage in 
sex over a period of i and where the Defendant also indecently 
exposed himself to the Plaintiff was conduc I i.lni.ltjcd as extreme 
n» . uable. In addition, an abuse of a position of leail • 
7 
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apparent power or authority over the Plaintiff is frequent 
to be outrageously offensive. Thus, the California Supreme Court 
held an insurance company liable for . I ,, iofus.iL to settle the 
claim within the policy limit where a subsequent jury award against 
the insured rendered the insured indigent. Unruh v Truck Ins. 
Exch. , 7 Cal.3d 61 6, -nil I ,1 1111,1, It)? ral.Hpti. uxl (1972). 
Also, „ rubbish collectors association, was held "M.., ie im 
intentional infliction of mental distress when it threatened to 
beat up the Plaintiff and put him out of bu.Minp&H unless he paid a 
substantial sum to the association for its receipt of an account 
from one of its member. State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v 
Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952). 
There is a genuine issues of material fact as to whether or 
not there has been outrageous COL y the Defendant Pat !)• 
Brian. Those issues are: 
1. Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to obtain the written 
consent of the natural mother because he did not realize 
that the written consent that he had obtained from the 
natural mother prior to the birth of the child was not 
sufficient consent to finalize the adoption or that 
Defendant Pat B. Brian was too busy with other cases or 
otherwise occupied with becoming a judge to spend the 
time necessary to finalize the adoption. 
2. Whether Defendant Pat Brian was required to comp ti 
the Interstate Compact Act and failed to do so. 
3. Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to inform the 
Plaintiffs that he would not obtain the written consent 
of the natural mother, but would rely upon the theory of 
abandonment in order to finalize the adoption of the 
8 
minor child by the Plaintiffs. 
4. Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the 
physical custody of the Plaintiffs stating that the child 
was now theirs and to take the child and raise it as 
their own. 
5. Whether Defendant Pat Brian did not contact the natural 
mother to obtain her consent or finalize the adoption 
from the birth of the minor child until after being 
required to do so by the Plaintiffs in order to finalize 
the adoption. 
6. Whether Defendant Pat Brian attempted to use Alden Porter 
and Richard Stowe to influence and/or coerce the 
Plaintiffs to drop their law suit. 
7. Whether Defendant Pat Brian, through co-Defendant Nielsen 
& Senior, contacted the FBI representatives and SBA 
representatives in order to pressure Plaintiffs into 
dropping their suit against the Defendant Pat B. Brian. 
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all 
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Samms 
v Eckle, supra. Generally, conduct is outrageous where the 
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would 
arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim 
"outrageous". The conduct of Pat Brian would lead any member of 
the community to exclaim "outrageous" and arouse his resentment 
against the Defendant Pat Brian. 
Defendant Pat Brian's actions are extreme and intolerable. To 
have placed a child in the physical custody of prospective adoptive 
parents without informing them that the natural mother may not give 
her consent to the adoption and that after bonding with the child, 
9 
the adoptive parents may loose that child is extreme and 
intolerable conduct on behalf of the Defendant. Also, Defendant 
Pat Brian, being an attorney, was in a position of authority over 
the Plaintiffs. He was xequired to understand the law of adoption 
and by informing the Plaintiffs that the child was theirs and to 
take the child home and to raise that child as one of their own and 
that there were no problems with the adoption, he used his position 
to place the Plaintiffs in a position where they may loose their 
adoptive daughter while believing that the Defendant had performed 
all the work that he was required to perform as their attorney, 
which included obtaining the consent of the natural mother and 
father and complying with all statutory requirements in order for 
the adoption to be finalized. 
Therefore, there is an issue of material fact as to whether or 
not the Defendants conduct was outrageous. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS INTENT TO CAUSE OR THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OF 
PROBABILITY OF CAUSING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
There are issues of material fact as to whether or not 
Defendant Pat Brian intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the 
probability of causing emotional distress to the Plaintiffs. The 
issues of material fact are: 
1. Whether Defendant Pat Brian totally disregarded the 
bonding between the Plaintiffs and the minor child. 
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2. Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the 
physical possession of the Defendants stating that the 
child was now theirs and to take the child home and raise 
it as their own. 
3. Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the 
physical custody of the Plaintiffs without informing them 
that he would not seek the written consent of the natural 
mother but would finalize the adoption on the theory of 
abandonment and Defendant failed to inform the 
Plaintiffs, after having the child in their physical 
custody that after caring for and loving the child and 
bonding to that child for a period of a year or more 
could loose that minor child if abandonment on the part 
of the natural mother could not be shown. 
4. Whether Defendant Pat B. Brian and/or others representing 
him contacted the FBI and SBA causing further financial 
concerns and further Court proceedings to the Plaintiffs 
with the express intent to discourage the Plaintiffs from 
continuing to proceed with their law suit against the 
Defendant. 
5. Whether Defendant Pat Brian and/or others representing 
him contacted church authorities to influence the 
Plaintiffs to dismiss their suit against the Defendant. 
The Defendant is most clearly liable where he acts with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress. Samms v Eccles, supra. 
Even where the ultimate purpose is impersonal, such as infliction 
of emotional distress for the purpose of debt collection, if the 
intent of the result of the conduct is mental suffering, the 
Defendant will be found liable. Duty v General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 
16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954). Certainly the contacting of the 
representatives of the FBI and SBA and the representatives of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints by Pat Brian and/or his 
11 
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representatives was an intentional act performed by the Defendant 
with the intent to cause the Plaintiffs mental suffering and 
persuade them to dismiss their law suit. Defendants acts in 
informing others that the Plaintiffs had been involved in many law 
suits is also an act by Defendant to deliberately cause the 
Plaintiffs mental suffering and influenced the Plaintiffs to 
dismiss their law suit. Defendant's acts to use the Plaintiffs 
name and to have the names made public is also a deliberate act by 
Defendant to cause Plaintiffs mental suffering and influence the 
Plaintiffs to dismiss their law suit. See Attached Exhibit A 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
Reckless or wanton behavior may also result in liability 
whether the Defendants acts and deliberate disregard of a high 
degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow. 
Restatement 2d of Torts, Section 46, comment I (1964). There is no 
question that any reasonable person would have known that emotional 
distress would result where Plaintiffs were suddenly confronted or 
threatened with the loss of their adoptive daughter. The loss of 
an adoptive daughter is akin to the death of a natural child. Any 
reasonable person would have known that emotional distress would 
result from the death of a natural child. See Affidavit of Dr. 
Ralph Gant marked as Exhibit B attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
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All of the actions of the Defendant show that he intended to 
cause emotional distress or that he recklessly disregarded the 
probability of causing emotional distress to the Plaintiffs. 
C. SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Restatement 2d of Torts defines emotional distress as 
including all highly unpleasant mental reactions. Restatement 2d 
of Torts, Section 46, Comment J (1964). The California Supreme 
Court has held that mental suffering includes nervousness, grieff 
anxietyf worry, shockf humiliation, and indignity as well as 
physical pain. Criscy v Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn*, 66 
Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.Rptr. 13 (1967). Restatement 2d 
of Torts further states that the law intervenes only where the 
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be 
expected to endure it. Restatement 2d of Torts, Section 46, 
Comment J (1964). This requirement of severity helps to ensure 
that the harm alleged by the Plaintiff is real. Nevertheless, in 
Utah the cause of action for emotional distress exists even where 
the Plaintiffs mental suffering is not accompanied by bodily impact 
or physical injury. Samms v Eccles, supra. 
There are issues of material fact regarding the severity of 
the emotional distress of the Plaintiffs. The issues are: 
1. Whether the Plaintiffs suffer from Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder. 
13 
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2. Whether Plaintiffs have been unable to live a normal life 
by living in constant paranoia, nausea, fear, etc. 
3. Whether Plaintiffs have been unable to function as a 
result of the actions of the Defendant. Plaintiff James 
Johnson has been unable to obtain a meaningful position 
in order to support his family. Plaintiff Jennifer 
Johnson has been unable to care for her family, to 
provide for them the motherly love and attention that 
they require. See Exhibit B , Affidavit of James Johnson 
marked as Exhibit C attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference and Affidavit of Jennifer Johnson 
marked as Exhibit D attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
It is quite clear from the Affidavits of Dr. Gant that the 
Plaintiffs suffer from severe emotional distress, that Post 
Traumatic Stress Syndrome and major depression are clearly severe 
emotional distress. 
D. AN ACTUAL OR PROXIMATE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE TORTUOUS 
CONDUCT AND THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
There is a dispute of material facts as to whether there is an 
actual or proximate casual link between the tortuous conduct of the 
Defendant and the emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiffs. 
The issues are: 
1. Whether Defendants failure to inform the Plaintiffs that 
they may loose the child after the child had been placed 
in their physical custody and being informed by the 
Defendant that the child was theirs and they should take 
the child home and raise it as their own. 
2. Whether the emotional distress of the Defendants began 
with the learning by Plaintiffs that the child that had 
been in their possession for nearly one year and they 
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believed to be their own could be taken from their 
possession at any time and that the natural mother did 
have the right to take that child from their possession. 
3. Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to inform the 
Plaintiffs at any time that the Plaintiffs may loose the 
custody of the minor child and that the natural mother 
had full right to take the child from their custody and 
raise the child. 
Verdicts for personal injuries will not be sustained where 
there is no expert medical testimony establishing causation, W. 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Section 12 at 51, n. 40 (4th 
Ed. 1971). Dr. Gant states that the emotional distress suffered by 
the Plaintiffs is caused by the threatened loss of the adoptive 
daughter of the Plaintiffs. 
There is no question that Defendant Pat Brian's conduct caused 
the emotional distress of the Plaintiffs. 
POINT III 
REASONABLE MEN MAY DIFFER AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANT PAT B. BRIAN 
IS LIABLE FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
DISCUSSION 
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury subject to 
the control of the court to determine whether in the particular 
case the conduct has been sufficiently outrageous to result in 
liability. Gvai v Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 503 P.2d 449, 450 
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(1972). Quoting Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 46, h. The facts 
in this matter support the assertion that reasonable men could 
differ as to whether the conduct of Defendant was so outrageous and 
extreme that it offended the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. Certainly, there is a dispute as to whether 
or not the Defendant intentionally or with reckless disregard 
failed to obtain the consent of the natural mother and placed the 
minor child in the custody of the Plaintiffs, assuring them that 
the child was theirs and to take the child home and raise it as 
their own and contacting FBI representatives and SBA 
representatives and church representatives in order to influence 
the Plaintiffs to dismiss their lawsuit against the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there are issues of material facts, the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment should be denied. 
"day of January, 1992. 
DARWlN^Cr-FISHER ~" 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing on this $**• day of xj^^jfOftfl , 199^by 
first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
c/o Mark Dowdle 
915 W. 100 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
Arthur Nielsen 
Larry Whyte 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 E. South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Chris Schmutz 
3760 South Highland Drive, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
\clientdf\johnBon\memoran4.opp 
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Arthur II. Nielsen (A2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 532-1900 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
NIELSEN Si SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, and 
CHRIS L. SCIIMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Fifth Claim 
for Relief for negligent misrepresentation as contained in 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In January 1986, Plaintiffs retained Defendant Nielsen 
& Senior and Pat B. Brian in a private adoption matter. 
1H06 
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2. On or about June 27, 1986, Plaintiffs obtained custody 
of the infant child. 
3. From June 27, 1986 to date, the infant child has been 
in the continuous care and custody of Plaintiffs. 
4. The natural mother did not give her formal written 
consent as required by Jaw to Plaintiffs' adoption of the infant 
child until October 1987. 
5. In JuJy J 987, the natural mother initiated a Habeas 
Corpus proceeding allegedly for the purpose of regaining custody 
of the infant child. 
6. In July 1987, Plaintiffs retained a new law firm in the 
private adoption matter. 
7. Ln October 1987, the natural mother gave her formal 
written consent to the adoption and Plaintiffs' adoption of the 
infant child was finalized. 
8. In June 1990, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action 
against this Defendant and others. 
9. Pursuant to order of this Court, discovery cut-off 
period is December 30, 1991. 
10. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim 
are not stated with particularity. 
11. No evidence has been produced establishing or 
supporting Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief or any of the 
allegations contained therein. 
ARGUMENT 
11406 -2-
A • ElaLilLfci ffsj Fifth Claim for Relief for Negligent 
Misrepresentation should be Dismissed. 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity 
. . . ." This requirement, that circumstances constituting fraud 
shall be stated with particularity includes not only allegations 
of common law fraud, of which negligent misrepresentation is an 
outgrowth, but reaches all circumstances where the pleader 
alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other 
deceptions covered by the term "fraud" in its broadest dimension. 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656, P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
It is undisputed that the averments contained within Plaintiffs' 
Fifth Claim for Relief for negligent misrepresentation do not 
contain the basic facts required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and are not set forth with the requisite 
particularity. Therefore, Defendant Nielsen & Senior is entitled 
to an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief as a 
matter of law. Ileathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d. 266, 372 P.2d 990 
(1962) . 
B. Defendant Nielsen & Senior is Entitled to Partial Summary 
Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
It has long been recognized that the major purpose of 
summary judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a 
1U06 - 3 -
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genuine issue to present to the fact finder. Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. v. Lunduren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
The ULali Supreme Court in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Company, 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) set forth 
the required elements to establish negligent misrepresentation. 
Negligent misrepresentation is a tort which grew out of 
common-law fraud. We defined it in Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d. 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659, 
662 (1967)f as follows: Where (1) one having a 
pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a 
superior position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them, and (4) expecting the other party to 
rely and act thereon, and (5) the other party 
reasonably does so, and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if 
the other elements of fraud are also present. 
[Subdivision added.] (Emphasis added.) 
See Masters v. Worsely, 777 P. 2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), for 
the other elements required to establish fraud. 
The discovery period expires today. To date, no evidence 
has been forthcoming to support Plaintiffs' claim of negligent 
misrepresentation, or any of the allegations contained within 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief. Furthermore, no evidence has 
been forthcoming, and, in fact, none exists to support or 
demonstrate the existence of the required elements of negligent 
misrepresentation as set forth above. As a result, Defendant is 
entitled to partial summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' Fifth 
Claim for Relief as a matter of law, inasmuch as it is clear from 
the undisputed facts, answers to interrogatories, depositions, 
and all other discovery, that Plaintiffs are unable to prevail on 
1H06 -4-
said cause of action. See Condor v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 
739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1907); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers, 
liic^ , 739 P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Aird Insurance Agency 
y__. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have failed sufficiently to plead their Fifth 
Claim for Relief of negligent misrepresentation. However, even 
if properly pleaded, no evidence exists to support said claim or 
any of the required elements thereof. Therefore, Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior submits that it is entitled to an order either 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief or for an order of 
partial summary judgment in its favor against the Plaintiffs on 
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief and respectfully requests that 
this Court enter an order to that effect. 
DATED this <^l) day of December, 1991. 
Arthur H. Nielsen, %sq. 
Larry L. Whyte, Esq. 
of Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior 
,a 
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Arthur H. Nielsen (A2405) 
Larry L. Whyte (4942) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple 
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No.: (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
and ] 
) DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S 
) REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
) MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Reply to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior disputes Plaintiffs' Statement of 
Undisputed Facts as follows: 
No. 3 - Pat Brian was an employee, but was not a principal 
of Nielsen & Senior during 1986. 
1 1 2 9 6 
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No. 5 - Defendants did obtain the consent of the natural 
mother to the adoption prior to the birth of the 
minor child. Thereafter, despite Defendants' 
attempts, the natural mother refused to give her 
written consent to the adoption of the minor 
child, until the matter was settled by the payment 
to the natural mother of more money. 
No. 6 - Defendants, not knowing the identity of the 
natural father, obtained, in January, 1987, a 
certificate from the Utah State Department of 
Health certifying that no notice of paternity had 
been filed by any person claiming to be the 
natural father of the minor child. 
No. 7 - Defendants contacted both the Utah and Texas 
Interstate Compact Directors. The requirements of 
the Interstate Compact Act were ultimately waived 
upon the request of the Utah Director of the 
Interstate Compact, William Ward. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW, MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Rodger^, 763 
P. 2d 771, 782 (Utah 1988) recognized that a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress could be maintained, 
-2-
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within the parameters of Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts (1965). To recover under Section 313, Plaintiffs must 
plead and prove that: (1) they witnessed a physical an injury to 
a closely related person; (2) they suffered mental anguish 
manifested as a physical injury; and (3) they were within the 
zone-of-danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm created by defendant's negligence. Contrary to their 
assertions, Plaintiffs have not met any of these three 
requirements. 
In adopting Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson analyzed and rejected 
other theories of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. See Johnson at pp. 780-82. Specifically, the court 
analyzed the case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 27 
Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) and rejected 
it. 
Plaintiffs are unable as a matter of fact and law, to meet 
the criterion set forth in Section 313. Clearly the case law of 
Utah does not allow the maintenance of a cause of action for 
emotional distress or the recovery of damages therefore except in 
the limited circumstances set forth in those cases, which 
circumstances do not exist in the instant action. Plaintiffs' 
claims for recovery of damages for emotional distress are 
squarely contrary to Utah law and should be summarily rejected by 
this Court. 
-3-
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II. 
PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
The case of Lambert v. _aine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 
(1953) is distinguishable from the instant action. Lambert v. 
Sine involved intentional not negligent conduct or wrong. The 
Supreme Court, following previously established guidelines, 
properly awarded damages for emotional distress, although it is 
interesting to note they awarded only $250. 
Plaintiffs' use of and citation to California authority to 
support their theory of recovery for emotional distress damages 
absent any physical injuries, is further misplaced for at least 
two reasons: First and foremost, the case of Tara Motors v. 
Jasper, 226 Cal. App. 3d 640, 276 Cal, Rptr. 603 (1990), simply 
follows the earlier California decision of Molien, supra, which 
was affirmatively rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, 
supra. It should be noted that the Utah Supreme Court, as 
recently as 1990, followed Johnson v. Rodgers in holding that a 
plaintiff's failure to met the standard enunciated in Section 313 
would bar recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. £eg Dalley v, Utah^Valley Regional Medical Ctr>, 791 
P.2d 193, 201 (Utah 1990). See also Hhite V> Blackburn, 787 P.2d 
1315, 1318 (Utah App. 1990). 
Second, Plaintiffs use of and citation to JuDay v. Rotunno & 
Rotunno, 2 76 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1990) is inappropriate. The 
California Supreme Court entered an order on April 25, 1991, that 
-4-
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Lhe JuDay opinion not be officially published and Plaintiffs' 
citation to it is in violation of California Rules of Court, Rule 
977, and Rule 4-500 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
both of which prohibit use or citation of unpublished opinions 
absent circumstances not present in this case. Since the JuDay 
opinion has no precedential value it should be ignored. 
Even if this Court were to follow California law on this 
issue, it is also significant to note that the very case upon 
which Plaintiffs rely, Tar a Motors, supra, in n. 5 at p. 609, 
stated that in a legal malpractice action, emotional distress 
damages were not recoverable for breach of contract. 
Specifically, the court stated: 
We do not reach [appellee's] somewhat novel argument 
emotiona] distress damages are recoverable for breach 
of contract. Nonetheless, we note that we have found 
no authority which supports her contention. Indeed, in 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 654, 
666-60, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373, upon which 
she relies, the Supreme Court took great care in 
drawing the distinction between contract-based causes 
of action, for which only contract remedies are 
available, and causes of action based upon the breach 
of obligations imposed by law for which traditional 
tort remedies are available. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendant Nielsen & Senior respectfully requests this 
Court to grant its Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action in its Second Amended Complaint 
-5-
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for negligent infliction of emotional distress and for all the 
emotional distress damages or associated damages. 
DATED this 5 " day o f December, 1991. 
QAZJU^J rfYUU^ 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
of Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
Counsel for Defendant Nielsen & Senior 
CERTIFJICAXE OF SERVICE 
I liereby certify that on the
 x<JLL. day of Decemberf 1991, I 
served upon Plaintiffs a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT by 
causing the same to be hand delivered to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER 
3319 N. University #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Chris L. Schmutz, Esq, 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025) 
Attorney for Defendants 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone : (801)531-0060 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN and 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants, 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 900400 
Judge Venoy Christoffersen 
Defendant Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel in pursuant to 
Rule 56 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order 
granting partial summary judgement in favor of Defendant Brian and 
against Plaintiff's as to Plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
This motion is based upon the fact that Defendant Brian is 
entitled to judgement as a matter of law and that no genuine as to 
any material fact exists with respect to such claim for relief. 
This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Pat B. Brian and the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025) 
Attorney for Defendants 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Telephone: (801)531-0060 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN and 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
JOINDER IN MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT 
%0 
Civil No. 9004004-eClT 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendant, Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel, hereby joins 
in the motion for Partial Summary Judgement dated November 8, 
1991, filed by Defendant Nielson and Senior, seeking summary 
Judgement dismissing Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief for 
negligent affliction of emotional distress as well as summary 
judgement denying all damages associated with or arising out of 
any claim for emotional distress. 
Defendant Pat B. Brian further joins in and adopts the 
reasoning and authorities set forth the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, dated November 8, 1991, 
filed by Nielson and Senior in s«.| p^rt of its motion. 
Partial Summary Judgement filed herewith, as well as the second 
Affidavit of Mark J. Howard previously filed in this matter. 
DATED this day of December, 1991, 
c 
(lliduSi • ZL 
Michael L. Dowdlej Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant, 
Pat B. Brian 
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DATED this ' 2*A day of December, 1991 
ik n 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Z 
Pat B. Brian 
U2h 
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and 
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEILSON & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN, 
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christofferson 
Plaintiffs, James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson, hereby 
submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant, Neilson 
& Senior's, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs' 
third claim for relief for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress as well as all damages associated with or arising out of 
any claim for emotional distress. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In January, 1986, Plaintiffs retained Defendant Neilson & 
Senior in a private adoption matter. 
2. On or about June 27, 1986, Plaintiffs obtained physical 
custody of the infant child from Pat Brian. 
3. Pat B. Brian was a principal and employee of Defendant 
Neilson & Senior during 1986 and through May 1987. 
4. From June 27, 1986, three days after the birth of the 
minor child to the present time, the infant child has been in the 
continuous care and physical custody of Plaintiffs. 
5. Defendant failed to obtain the consent of the natural 
mother for the adoption of the minor child. 
6. Defendant failed to obtain the consent of the natural 
father to the adoption of the child by Plaintiffs and failed to 
take any action to prevent the natural father from exercising his 
rights to the minor child. 
7. Defendant failed to comply with the Interstate Compact 
Act. 
8. In approximately July 1987, the Plaintiffs sought the 
legal services of another law firm and attorney, Mark Robinson. 
9. In July 1987, the natural mother initiated a habeas corpus 
proceeding for the purpose of gaining physical custody of the 
infant child. 
10. In October, 1987, the natural mother gave her consent to 
the adoption and Plaintiffs' adoption of the infant child was 
finalized. 
11. In June 1990, Plaintiffs initiated a malpractice action 
against defendant Neilson & Senior and others. 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS• CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
LAW 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to 
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting 
illness or bodily harm if the actor: 
(a) Should have realized that his conduct involved an 
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than 
by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person; and 
(b) From facts known to him should have realized that the 
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or 
bodily harm. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no application to 
illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional 
distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person, 
unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other. 
POINT I 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM IS AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE 
OF ACTION RECOGNIZED IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah recognizes a broad protected interest in mental 
tranquility, Johnson v. Rogers, 763, P.2d, 771, (Utah 1980), citing 
Jeppesen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P 429 (1960). Utah courts 
further recognize that an independent cause of action for negligent 
infliction of emotional harm exists in the State of Utah. Johnson, 
supra. 
Utah courts have abandoned the "impact" rule and have adopted 
3 
the "zone of danger" rule set forth in the Restatement of Torts, 2d 
1018 (1965). In addition, the court in Johnson has made it clear 
that other approaches will be considered: 
"at some future date, we may determine that there is merit 
in some of the other approaches surveyed in Justice Durham's 
opinion. However, until we have had experience with the cause 
of action, I conclude that it is best to take the more 
conservative approach and adopt the restatement rule as 
written." Johnson, supra at 785. 
To establish a cause of action under Section 313 (1) of the 
Restatement 2d of Torts (1965), the Plaintiff must show: 
1. That Defendant unintentionally caused emotional distress 
to Plaintiff; 
2. That Defendant should have realized that its conduct 
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the emotional 
distress; and 
3. That from the facts known to Defendant, Defendant 
should have realized that the distress might result in 
illness or bodily harm. 
This rule applies only where Defendant's negligent conduct 
threatens Plaintiff with emotional distress likely to result in 
bodily harm or illness because of Plaintiff's emotional 
disturbance. Restatement 2nd of Torts, section 313, note d. 
In addition, Plaintiff may be the direct victim and need not be a 
bystander witnessing an injury to a third party. Restatement 2d of 
Torts, section 313. 
Plaintiffs may maintain their cause of action under Section 
313 (1) of the Restatement 2nd of Torts, (1965). Plaintiffs suffer 
4 
from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome caused by the negligent actions 
of Defendants in failing to obtain the consent of the natural 
mother and fulfill the requirements of the Interstate Compact Act 
in order to promptly finalize the adoption of the minor child by 
the Plaintiffs. Defendants, by delivering the minor child to the 
Plaintiffs in June 1986f and allowing the child and the Plaintiffs 
to bond for a period in excess of one year, should have realized 
that their conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing 
emotional distress to the Plaintiffs when Plaintiffs discovered 
that the adoption had not been finalized, the consent of the 
natural mother had not been obtained, and that the natural mother 
still had legal rights to the minor child. Certainly Defendants, 
having been frequently informed of the bonding taking place between 
the Plaintiffs and the minor child, should have realized that the 
Plaintiff's emotional distress, upon learning of the Defendant's 
negligence, might have resulted in illness and even bodily harm. 
Plaintiffs are the clients of the Defendant. They are direct 
victims and as such are entitled to maintain their cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the 
Defendant. 
In addition, Plaintiffs may maintain an independent cause of 
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Section 
436(1) Restatement 2d of Torts (1965). Section 436(1) applies to 
situations where the Defendant's negligent conduct causes emotional 
distress but not the bodily harm which results from the emotional 
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distress. In order for Defendant to be liable to Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff must show: 
1. That the Defendant's conduct is negligent as violating a 
duty of care to protect Plaintiff from emotional distress; and 
2. Defendant should have recognized his conduct as involving 
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm. 
The fact that the emotional harm results solely through the 
internal operation of the emotional distress does not protect 
Defendant from liability. Subsection (1) is applicable only where 
Defendant's conduct is intended or obviously likely to cause 
emotional distressf although not intended to cause the bodily harm 
which results from it. Restatement 2d of Tortsf Section 436 n.a. 
This rule applies where Defendant intends to subject or should 
realize Plaintiff is likely to be subjected to emotional distress 
so severe that a reasonable man would realize the likelihood that 
might produce harmful physical consequences• 
"Where such a duty exists, it would be deprived of all 
sanction and the purpose for which it was imposed would be 
defeated if recovery were denied because the harm was 
sustained solely through the operation of emotional distress." 
Section 436, Restatement 2nd of Torts, (1965) 
Plaintiffs may also maintain their cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress under Section 436 
Restatement 2nd of Torts (1965). Defendants failed to obtain the 
consent of the natural mother, to fulfill the requirements of the 
Interstate Compact Act, and as a result failed to protect 
Plaintiffs from emotional distress. Defendants should have 
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recognized that his failure to properly handle the adoption 
proceedings involved an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the 
Plaintiffs. As a result of Defendant's negligent actions, 
Plaintiffs have suffered from sleeplessness, tears, loss of 
appetite, anxiety, headaches, fear of loss of the family, etc, 
depressions and Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Though transitory 
non-recurring physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as 
dizziness, vomiting, and the like, do not make the Defendants 
liable, when such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and 
do not amount to any substantial bodily harm, long continued nausea 
or headaches may amount to physical illness which is bodily harm. 
And even long continued mental disturbances, such as in the case of 
repeated hysterical attacks or mental aberration may be classified 
by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental character. 
This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem rather than one of 
law. Restatement 2nd of Torts, Section 436 (a) (1969) n.c. 
ISSUE II 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
LAW 
MENTAL PAIN AND SUFFERING IN CONNECTION WITH A WRONG WHICH, APART 
FROM SUCH PAIN AND SUFFERING CONSTITUTES A CAUSE OF ACTION, IS A 
PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES WHERE IT IS A NATURAL AND PROXIMATE 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE WRONG. Lambert v. Sine, 123 UT 145, 150, 256 
P.2d 241, 244 (1953) 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES WHICH ARE A NATURAL 
OR PROXIMATE CONSEQUENCE OF DEFENDANTS' MALPRACTICE. 
DISCUSSION 
Legal malpractice constitutes both a tort and a breach of 
contract. When an attorney breaches a duty owed to his clientf he 
is liable for all damages directly and proximately caused by his 
act or failure to act. Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 
1988) . 
In Lambert v. Sine, supra, the Utah courts recognize mental 
pain and suffering to be an element of damage where: 
1. It is a natural and proximate consequence of the 
Defendant's wrongful act, and 
2. There is a cause of action that exists apart from the pain 
and suffering. 
Plaintiffs have a cause of action for breach of contract as 
well as a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs is clearly 
a natural and proximate consequence of Defendant's wrongful acts. 
Further, Defendants breached the attorney-client contract with 
Plaintiffs by failing to obtain the consent of the natural mother 
and natural father, failing to comply with Interstate Compact Act, 
and failing to file a petition for adoption. JuDav v Rotunno & 
Rotunno, No. B040006 (Cal. App.2d App. Dist. Div. 7, Dec. 10, 
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1990). Tara Moters v. Superior Ct.r No, D012620, (Cal. App. 4th 
App. Dist. Div. One, Dec. 21, 1990). 
Clearly the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs upon 
learning that they did not have the legal right to keep the minor 
child was foreseeable. Plaintiffs had the minor child in their 
home for more than one year prior to learning that they did not 
have the legal right to keep the minor child and Plaintiff's family 
had bonded with the minor chiJd and had cared for, nurtured, and 
financially supported the minor child. 
Recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted 
for breach of contract which directly concerns the comfort, 
happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties. Crisci v 
Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 58 
Cal. Rptr. 13, 66 C.2d 425 (1967). To support emotional distress 
as an element of damages in a breach of contract case, the 
Plaintiff must show Defendants: 
1. Intentional conduct; or 
2. Wanton or reckless conduct; and 
3. Defendant must have reason to know when the contract was 
made, that the breach of the contract would cause mental 
suffering for reasons other than pecuniary loss. 
Thomas v French, 638 P.2d 613, 30 Wash App. 811, review 
granted, reverse 659 P.2d 1097, 99 Wash 2d 95 (1981). 
The actions of the Defendant in failing to exercise the skill, 
prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity 
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of finalizing an 
adoption is certainly wanton or reckless conduct and perhaps rises 
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to the level of intentional conduct. Certainly, the Defendants had 
reason to know, when the contract was made, that a breach would 
cause mental suffering by the Plaintiffs for reasons other than 
pecuniary loss. 
Therefore, Defendant's negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is a proper element of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The "impact" rule is no longer applicable in the State of 
Utah. The Utah courts have adopted the "zone of danger" rule which 
does allow for an independent cause of action for the Negligent 
InfJiction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiffs clearly have met the 
criteria set forth in Section 313 and Section 436 of the 
Restatement 2nd of Torts (1965). As such Plaintiffs may maintain 
their cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress and Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment should 
be denied. 
It is also well established in Utah that mental pain and 
suffering is a proper element of damages in legal malpractice 
cases. Therefore, Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment 
should be denied. "T~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J day of December, 1991. 
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Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405 
Larry L. Whyte, USB No. 4942 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen 
& Senior 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER 
L. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah 
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN 
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, 
Defendants. ] 
| MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
| JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 900400460CN 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Defendant Nielsen & Senior hereby moves this Court for an 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant 
Nielsen & Senior and against Plaintiffs as to Plaintiffs' Third 
Claim for Relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
as well as all damages associated with or arising out of any 
claim for emotional distress. 
Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as to this claim 
for relief as a matter of law. This Motion is supported by the 
accompanying Memorandum. 
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DATED this ^^S day of November, 1991. 
Arthur/H". Nielsen 
Larry L. Whyte 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this X*-^ day of November, 1991, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. / // /\ 
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER C//W"</e//'Mr^ J 
3319 N. University #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
915 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Chris L. Schmutz, Esq. 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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